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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST:
STEPS TOWARD STRIKING A
BALANCE
James Langenfeldt
INTRODUCTION
Although intellectual property and antitrust laws may be
both "aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competi-
tion,"' a tension between intellectual property and antitrust policy
has always existed. This tension has been brought into clearer fo-
cus by a number of recent court decisions, including the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 2 the Federal Circuit's decision rejecting the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in In re Independent Service Organizations Anti-
trust Litigation ("Xerox"),3 the decisions in Intergraph Corp. v.
Intel Corp.,4 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., and
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.,6 and the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC") allegations and consent in Intel. As Former FTC
Chairman Pitofsky remarked:
[T]he broader implications of the Xerox decision are trou-
bling. Traditionally, cases at the intersection between intel-
t Director, LECG, LLC and Senior Research Fellow, AAI. The author thanks Robert
Taylor, James Kobak, Jr., and Richard Higgins for discussions and materials on the subject. The
paper also benefits from the comments of members of the AAI P/AT Interface Committee.
David Johanson ofLECG, LLC provided excellent research assistance for this paper. However,
the paper only represents the views of the author, and not necessarily these scholars, LECG,
LLC, or the AAT.
1 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
2 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
3 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. CSU v. Xerox Corp., 131 S. Ct.
1077 (2001).
4 195 F.3d 1346, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
5 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
6 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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lectual property and antitrust laws have been analyzed by ex-
amining the impact on economic incentives and balancing
them against anticompetitive effects .... An approach that
starts from the point of view that a patent holder does not
have to sell or license to anyone, and proceeds from that un-
challenged assumption to the rule that it therefore can condi-
tion its sales or licenses in any way it sees fit (with tie-in
sales as the sole antitrust exemption), would be an unwise
and unfortunate departure from the traditional approach in
this area. I question whether there is a reason to believe any
such interpretation is necessary to encourage the innovation
process.7
Given the "new economy," where firms may be more likely to base
their competitive advantage on intellectual property rather than brick
and mortar assets, this tension could grow and is likely to become an
even more important policy issue.8 The purpose of this Article is to
stimulate discussion of certain economic, legal, and policy issues that
arise from the tension between intellectual property and antitrust.
I. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OPTIMAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
One key problem in analyzing the tension between intellectual
property and antitrust lies in a fundamental misconception about the
equivalence of intellectual and tangible property. The Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property9 state, "for the purpose of anti-
trust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being es-
sentially comparable to any other form of property."'  The Guide-
lines continue '"That is not to say that intellectual property is in all
respects the same as intangible property. Intellectual property has
important characteristics, such as ease of misappropriation, that dis-
tinguish it from many other forms of property."' Despite this recog-
7 Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Anti-
trust and Intellectual Property, Prepared Remarks Before the American Antitrust Institute Con-
ference, at http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/OOO615speech.htm (Jun. 15, 2000).
8 It should be clear that this paper and its recommendations are not designed to criticize
any particular set of companies. Even large companies with extensive patent portfolios find
themselves as plaintiffs and defendants in both private antitrust and intellectual property cases.
As discussed in the paper, the key issue is ensuring optimal intellectual property protection in
the light of potential competitive concerns.
9 DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENS-
ING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132
(1995).
'0 Id. § 2.0.
" Id.§2.1.
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nition, the Guidelines say in the next sentence: 'These characteristics
can be taken into account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and
do not require the application of fundamentally different principles."
12
Although it is true that in many ways the fundamental principles of
antitrust analysis can be applied to intellectual property, this appar-
ently broad simplification is not correct.
Some scholars have argued that intellectual property should be
given more primacy because of its constitutional status and its unique
economic characteristics. Setting aside the constitutional issues for
attorneys to debate, consider some of the characteristics that differen-
tiate intellectual property from other forms of property that may affect
antitrust analysis. These include:
" Substantial social benefits: Intellectual property often em-
bodies advancements that produce significant cost and per-
formance advantages. These advantages frequently spill over
into other industries. The benefits from innovation are gen-
erally not fully recovered by the inventor, particularly where
the legal regime for protecting the invention is weak. Anti-
trust rules which reduce the value of intellectual property or
discourage broad exploitation of intellectual property may
therefore impose a more substantial social cost than similar
rules applied to other forms of property.
" Importance of complementary assets: Perhaps to a greater
degree than other assets, successful exploitation of intellec-
tual property requires the owner to combine it with assets
owned by others. These may include other intellectual prop-
erty, product development assets, manufacturing assets, or
marketing assets. This fact may argue for broader tolerance
of intellectual property transactions in which the objective is
to obtain access to related assets.
" Substantial free-rider possibilities: Intellectual property is
accompanied by strong free-rider characteristics, which are
only partly overcome by legal protection. This leaves a
broad area in which protection against free-riding by private
action is socially desirable in order to maintain adequate in-
centives to invest in innovation.
* Substantial risk: Absent government research grants or other
subsidies, inventors assume substantial costs which are gen-
12 Id.
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erally not recoverable if the research does not lead to a
commercial product. The risk of recovering these sunk costs
is often higher than for other forms of investment: "Dry
holes' and 'blind alleys' are the rule and not the exception."
In view of this risk, antitrust rules that unduly limit the in-
vestment return of the successful inventor will discourage
invention.
13
In effect, these observations imply that "Schumpeterian,,14 in-
novation is much more valuable than marginal improvements in effi-
ciency and lower pricing that in general come from competition in the
short run, which is often the focus of antitrust policy. The argument
appears to be that antitrust laws can discourage innovation by not
adequately taking into account "spillover" benefits of innovations into
other markets and not adequately rewarding the inventor for her ef-
forts due to free riding. These observations argue for granting innova-
tors a safe harbor from normal antitrust concerns.
Other scholars have highlighted additional ways intellectual
property is different than tangible property. Gilbert and Tom have
recently written that intellectual property differs from tangible prop-
erty in at least the following aspects:
"[A] patent grants the owner a power of exclusion that, in
some respects, exceeds the powers that attach to tangible
property." 5 The owner of a factory can prevent someone
from trespassing on the factory grounds, but cannot prevent
someone from building another factory. The owner of a pat-
ent can prevent others from making or selling a similar prod-
uct, even if others create the product independently of the
knowledge embodied in the patent.
o "[T]he boundaries of intellectual property defy accurate sur-
vey to a much greater extent than with tangible property." 16 It
is often the case that neither a patentee nor a potential in-
fringer can know the precise scope of patent protection with-
out a final determination from a court of law.
13 See ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, ABA, THE 1995 FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMMENTARY AND TEXT 16-17 (1996) (citing
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements:
Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 579, 581-83 (1993)).
14 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 88, 103 (1942).
'- Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies?,
The Intellectual Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 47, n.8 (2001).
16 Id.
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The statutory language governing use of the property differs
from one form of property to another, giving rise to a variety
of interpretive questions. For example, § 271(d)(4) of the Pat-
ent Reform Act of 1988 provides that "[n]o patent owner oth-
erwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse
or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of having...
refused to license or use any rights to the patent."17 Some
have argued, and some courts have agreed, that this statutory
language confers an antitrust exemption to patentees for uni-
lateral refusals to deal, while others have vigorously dis-
agreed.18
Economically, these differences can be significant and under
certain circumstances argue for more, rather than less, limitation of
intellectual property rights.
First, a patent inherently can have a substantially larger impact
than tangible property on competition in any market, since its prop-
erty rights extend well beyond production facilities of a company.
Second, the duration of a patent at twenty years from filing can
ensure market power over a period of time seldom possible in markets
lacking legally granted rights of exclusion. Accordingly, a firm with
market power derived from a patent is more likely to be in a position
to exert its market power than one lacking patent related market
power.
Third, the threat of a patent suit can deter legitimate competi-
tion as well as tend to deter an innovator when there is less certainty
about the extent of the property right. If competitors are "risk averse"
as most economists believe, they will be less likely to legitimately
attempt to design around or build upon a patent.
Fourth, the unsettled nature of what unilateral actions a patent
holder can take again creates uncertainty that is likely to deter non-
patent holder actions, even when there may be a valid damage to
competition from a patent holder's actions.
It is clear that the same economics and law traditionally used to
analyze tangible assets do not always carry over to innovation and
intellectual property,19 especially in many parts of the new econ-
17 Patent & Trademark Office Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676
(1988) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) under Title I, Patent Misuse Reform).
18 See Gilbert & Tom, supra note 15, at 83-86 (noting the need for additional guidance in
the area of patent disputes).
19 See, e.g., Mary Coleman & James Langenfeld, Antitrust Analysis and Remedies in
High-Tech Industries, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., June-July, 2001, at 42 (1998) ("The very
nature of competition, the definition of industries, the basis of competitive advantage, the effects
20011
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omy. 20 It should also be clear, however, that the differences between
intellectual and tangible property do not imply that antitrust is irrele-
vant or counterproductive. As discussed above, in some ways intel-
lectual property raises more, rather than less antitrust concerns.
These differences need to be more explicitly recognized and
studied in determining the trade off between patent protection and
competitive concerns. Patents and other intellectual property rights
are critical in stimulating innovation and ensuring dynamic competi-
tion, particularly in the new economy.21 These intellectual property
rights must be protected. There should not be a return to 1972 and the
Department of Justice's "nine no-no' S.,,22 However, the differences
between intellectual and tangible property should not imply that over-
broad intellectual property rights should sweep away all concerns
about the competitive impact of manipulating intellectual property to
defeat competition. Landes and Posner have written:
For copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its princi-
pal legal doctrine must, at least approximately, maximize the
benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses
from limiting access and the costs of administering copyright
protection.23
As Landes and Posner point out, if intellectual property rights are en-
forced too strictly, then subsequent innovators who build upon earlier
innovations will be foreclosed and overall welfare will be reduced.
This principal also applies to patents and trade secrets. Moreover, if
an innovator were allowed to keep all of the surplus from an innova-
tion through extended property rights, then there would be no benefit
of 'restrictive' practices, and the nature of economic rents are all different in the context of
innovation.").
20 See Gilbert & Tom, supra note 15, at 45 ("[H]igh technology markets are characterized
by rapid rates of technological change, high fixed costs of research and development relative to
the variable costs of production, knowledge spillovers, and (sometimes) strong 'network ef-
fects."').
21 See James Langenfeld & David Scheffman, Innovation and U.S. Competition Policy, 34
ANTITRUST BuLL. 1, 1-3 (1989) (arguing that competition policy since 1945 has been overly
restrictive on new technology, including technology transfer between firms and joint ventures);
David Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-
Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 801-03 (1998) (arguing that antitrust agencies
lack understanding of the economics of innovation, especially critical for high technology mar-
kets).
22 See ABA TEXT & COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 5. At that time, the Department of
Justice's approach was to treat certain licensing practices as per se violations of antitrust laws,
such as a licensor and a licensee agreeing that the licensor will not grant further licenses to
others. Id.
23 William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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to the rest of society from the innovation. As such, innovations
would not drive the economy forward to more productivity, but would
only enrich the inventor.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the degree of intellectual
property protection on the number of innovations and total welfare.
The solid curve represents the relationship between the number of
innovations (vertical axis) and the degree of intellectual property pro-
tection (horizontal axis). With complete intellectual property protec-
tion (the left end of the graph) there will be a number of innovations,
but such protection will greatly limit the number of developmental
innovations by others. As the degree of protection is relaxed, the
number of innovations will increase to point A, where the number of
innovations is maximized. Further relaxation of intellectual property
rights after this point will begin to discourage the number of basic
innovations because on the margin innovators are less likely to able to
reap the full monetary gains from their innovations. With no intellec-
tual property protection (right end of the graph), there will still be
some innovations due to some innovators being able to capture gains
from having a "first mover" advantage in bringing an improved prod-
uct to market first. However, the number of innovations without any
intellectual property protection will be the lowest.
Figure 1: Optimal IP Protection
Conr1ete Protection A B No Protection
ofAll Claims of Claims
-- Degree of IP Protection -.
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Figure 1 then compares this pattern of the number of innovations
and degree of intellectual property protection to the relationship be-
tween the total welfare24 and intellectual property protection, repre-
sented by the dashed curve. With complete intellectual property pro-
tection, total welfare is relatively lower than the number of innova-
tions. Innovators gain all of the benefits from their innovations, there
is no price competition or competition from the follow innovations of
others, and no consumer surplus from innovations. As intellectual
property protection is relaxed (moving left to right in Figure 1), total
welfare increases to its peak at point B, with more development inno-
vations by others and more competition reducing prices and increas-
ing consumer welfare. The optimal total welfare will in general be at
point B, right of point A, indicating that total welfare is maximized
with less intellectual property protection than a structure designed to
maximize innovations.25  However, reducing intellectual property
protection below point B reduces total welfare as innovators have in-
creasingly less incentive to innovate and fewer innovations occur.
It should be clear from this discussion that a balancing of intel-
lectual property rights and competitive issues is clearly required, and
many are concerned that the courts may be moving to immunize from
antitrust any company action that could involve a patent. Such a
move could shift the balance so substantially that it would not only
eliminate any concerns about the benefits from short run price compe-
tition, but would prevent competition policy from helping to achieve
the common goal of antitrust and intellectual property rights - stimu-
lating useful innovations.
Assertions that the different types of property can be treated en-
tirely the same confuse rather than enlighten this basic trade-off be-
tween intellectual property and competition policy. Identifying the
proper balance requires a clearer depiction of the interests to be bal-
anced, and I believe this can only be achieved through explicit recog-
nition of the differences between tangible and intellectual property.
Given this recognition, we need more research that identifies and
24 See LYNNE PEPALL ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: CONTEMPORARY THEORY
AND PRACTICE 709, 711-12 (1999) (defining "total welfare" as the economic concept of the sum
of consumer and producer surplus: the value that consumers gain from purchasing a product in
excess of its price, plus the profits that the innovator realizes from the innovation).
25 Antitrust enforcement often focuses just on consumer surplus. See, e.g., Timothy J.
Muris, Robert Pitofsky: Public Servant and Scholar, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 25, 37 (2001)
(stating "there is wide-spread agreement that the purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers").
As such, the relationship between consumer surplus and the degree of intellectual property
protection would have a similar pattern to the total welfare curve, but optimal consumer welfare
will reach its maximum further to the right of B with less intellectual property protection. With
regard to balancing intellectual property rights and competition, it can be argued that maximiz-
ing consumer surplus may not be the most appropriate goal because it would lead to less intel-
lectual property protection and not adequately protect the profits of the innovators.
[Vol. 52:91
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quantifies the impact of the differences between tangible and intellec-
tual property on innovation and competition.
It. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LEGALLY
RECOGNIZABLE ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTS
A patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret holder should be
rewarded for her investments and risks to encourage competition in
innovations. Under the appropriate circumstances, however, even an
absolute property right to the intellectual property for a given innova-
tion should not permit a firm from extending that legal "monopoly"
into markets that do not involve products or services that are covered
by the patent. The Federal Circuit in a series of decisions has sought
to limit the circumstances where extension of a patent into different
markets could be considered anticompetitive. In In re Independent
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,26 ("Xerox"), described by
former Chairman Pitofsky above, the Federal Circuit stated "[i]n the
absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and
Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce
the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws."27 The
Supreme Court decided against reviewing the Federal Circuit's Xerox
decision, presumably in part because the Department of Justice ar-
gued that the issues needed to be better developed in the lower
courts.28 All appeals of antitrust cases involving patents go to the
Federal Circuit since the Federal Circuit asserted that power in No-
belpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.29 in 1998.30 Accordingly,
it would appear that the Federal Circuit, a court that specializes in
enforcing the patent laws, will be making both the relevant patent and
antitrust law. In effect, it has placed itself in the role of balancing of
patent and competition issues, and has also offered dicta as to how
other courts should review copyright and competition issues.
There is some question that the Federal Circuit will find many
instances that fit into the three areas that it has identified. Clearly, it
is difficult to prove a case of sham litigation relating to inequitable
conduct relating to a patent application since the Federal Court's first
opinion in Nobelpharma and a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision that
26 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub non. CSU v. Xerox Corp., 121 S. CL
1077 (2001).
27 Il at 1327.
28 For a discussion of the Department of Justice's Supreme Court Brief on Xerox, see
Melvin Schwartz, Balancing IP Rights and Competition, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Apr.-
May, 2001, at 28. I am not commenting on the merits of the Xerox case, but the apparent
breadth of the Federal Circuit's decision.
29 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30 Id. at 1068 ("[,]e conclude that we should decide these issues as a matter of Federal
Circuit law, rather than rely on various regional precedents.").
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litigation cannot be deprived of immunity unless it is objectively
baseless.3 1  There are cases that suggest a pattern of litigation can be
a sham, but the Federal Circuit has not yet recognized this type of
evidence of sham litigation in the context of patent law.32  The Fed-
eral Circuit did sustain one of the few antitrust verdicts of a Walker
Process3 3 fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") in Nobelpharma.34 However, the Federal Circuit made it
clear that the standard for showing fraud is quite high and that a fail-
ure to cite prior art will support liability only in "limited circum-
stances."
35
Even before its decision in Xerox, the Federal Circuit had
shown a sharp resistance to going beyond these three areas to allow
antitrust laws to interfere with an intellectual property holder's right
to refuse to deal, even though the antitrust agencies may not have
agreed. In Intergraph Corp v. Intel Corp.,36 the Federal Circuit over-
turned a district court opinion that had found antitrust liability against
Intel for refusing to deal with Intergraph.37 The district court had
found Intel had illegally denied its customer Intergraph access to Intel
chips and technical product development information.38 Intel cut In-
tergraph off from an existing relationship because Intergraph had sued
Intel for patent infringement, and Intergraph had refused Intel's de-
mand to enter a cross-licensing agreement for Intergraph's "Clipper
chip" patents at issue in the patent dispute. The district court viewed
Intel's chips and technology as an essential facility, and found that
31 See Columbia Pictures Indus., v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1530
(9th Cir. 1991), affd, 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
32 For example, in USS-Posco Industries v. Contra Costa County Building & Construction
Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit discussed the impact
of Professional Real Estate Investors on California Motor Transport, Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Ninth Circuit's decision states "California Motor Transport
deals with the case where the defendant is accused of bringing a whole series of legal proceed-
ings. Litigation is invariably costly, distracting and time-consuming; having to defend a whole
series of such proceedings can inflict a crushing burden on a business. California Motor Trans-
port thus recognized that the filing of a whole series of lawsuits and other legal actions without
regard to the merits has far more serious implications than filing a single action, and can serve
as a very effective restraint on trade.... the fact that a small number in the series of lawsuits
turn out not to be frivolous will not be fatal to a claim under California Motor Transport; even a
broken clock is right twice a day." USS-Posco Industries, 31 F.3d at 811 (affirming summary
judgment for union, as its lobbying did not constitute sham legislation/litigation activity under
Noerr-Pennington). See also Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Board. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100-
01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing sham litigation standard from Profl Real Estate Investors Inc.); Moore
U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358-59 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
33 See Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(remanding to the trial court to allow Walker the opportunity to make section 2 Sherman Act
claims more specific).
34 See Nobelphanna. 141 F.3d at 1061-62.'
35 Id. at 1070-71.
36 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
37 See id. at 1358-59.
38 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
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Intel was a monopolist that had "affirmative duties to refrain from
acting in a manner that unreasonably harms competition." 39  The
court enjoined Intel from refusing to deal with Intergraph and re-
quired Intel to provide Intergraph with the same supply of chips and
technical information provided to Intergraph's competitors.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, and the district
court eventually dismissed Intergraph's action.40 The Federal Circuit
found that Intergraph had not proven that Intel's withholding of "stra-
tegic benefits" from Intergraph was designed to enhance Intel's com-
petitive position in the microprocessor market. The Federal Circuit
stated:
[A]s we have stated, the owner of proprietary information has
no obligation to provide it, whether to a competitor, cus-
tomer, or supplier.... [A] customer who is dependent on a
manufacturer's supply of a component cannot on that ground
force the producer to provide it; there must be an anticom-
petitive aspect invoking the Sherman Act..... The district
court herein recognized that there must be an anticompetitive
intent, but ignored the absence of competition between Intel
and Intergraph.4'
The Federal Circuit also expressed concerns about the application of
the essential facility doctrine to intellectual property.42 With the Fed-
eral Circuit's decision in Xerox, this position appears to have hard-
ened, and eliminated any inquiry into intent.
At least the FTC and the Ninth Circuit have not agreed with the
Federal Circuit's opinions limiting antitrust liability. This can be
clearly seen in the FTC's recent consent with Intel,43 involving not
only the same actions by Intel's with regard to Intergraph, but similar
alleged incidents involving Digital Equipment Corporation and Com-
paq Computer Corporation. The FTC in its complaint alleged that
Intel's coercing these companies to cross licensing would illegally
maintain Intel's dominant position in microprocessor-related innova-
tion. In the Digital matter, the FTC alleged Digital was both a cus-
tomer and competitor of Intel. The FTC also charged that Intel had
no reasonable belief that these companies had, could, or would mis-
'9 Id. at 1277.
4 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d. 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2000)
41 Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1363.
42 See Ud at 1357 (stating that refusing to license a patent is not misuse or an illegal exten-
sion of patent rights) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)). It may be unwise and legally impossible to
force a legal monopoly to be treated as an essential facility. However, it is my understanding
that the American Antitrust Institute opposes any blanket rule that equal access could never be
required as long as there are some patent issues involved.
43 See In re Intel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (1999) (decision and order).
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use Intel's technical information or prototypes. The resulting consent
prevents Intel from discriminating against customers that have an in-
tellectual property dispute with Intel, providing that the customers are
not suing Intel for injunctive relief that would prevent Intel from
manufacturing chips. Whether the FTC will continue to be interested
in this type of case under the new administration will presumably de-
pend on the extent of empirical evidence that supports the allega-
tions44 and whether the FTC can show anticompetitive impact.45
In balancing intellectual property rights against competitive
concerns, there also may be other means to abuse a patent beyond the
three areas the Federal Circuit explicitly identifies in Xerox. The An-
titrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property Section 5
identifies areas of potential competitive harm from unilateral actions
to include exclusive dealing, as well tying arrangements 46 and en-
forcement of invalid intellectual property rights.47 Former Chairman
Pitofsky has challenged the Federal Circuit with four hypothetical
cases where the Circuit Court's approach in Xerox suggests that pat-
ent rights may eliminate any legal concerns over lost competition,
assuming the patent has given market power to the patent holder.48
(1) [A] patent holder refuses to sell except on condition that
the purchaser not buy from a potential competitor.
(2) [A]n inventor licensed an important process patent to five
firms .... One of the firms is a price cutter. [T]he inven-
tor terminates the license ... result[ing] from joint coer-
cive action by the other licensees ....
(3) [T]wo firms have entered into a patent pooling agreement
in which each firm retains veto power over the selection
of its partner's licensees .... [There exists] a unilateral
44 See Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 911-12 (2001) ("Sylvania was a milestone. [Sylvania's] insistence on
measuring restraints by 'demonstratable economic effect' provides a sound guide for the anti-
trust community....[Flollowing Sylvania, objective observers will decide these controversies
based upon empirical evidence.").
45 See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST LJ.
693, 718 (2000) ("[Tlhe crucial issue.., is not whether [the FrC's] VISX and Intel arguments
are correct. The issue is whether the plaintiffs should be required to show that, whatever its
impact on the firms in question, the conduct had an impact on the market.... Accordingly,
those cases should have proceeded, as have past Section 2 cases, to analyze all relevant issues,
including anticompetitive impact.").
46 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, § 5 (listing horizontal restraints, resale price
maintenance, tying arrangements, exclusive dealing, cross-licensing and pooling arrangements,
grantbacks, and acquisition of intellectual property rights).
47 See id. § 6.
48 Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Anti-
trust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 922 (2001).
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refusal to license, designed to reduce competition below
levels that would exist in the absence of the pooling
agreement, [and] the pooling agreement led to the refusal.
(4) [A] patent holder knowingly misinformed a standard-
setting organization that it had no patents in a particular
area, and as a result the organization developed a stan-
dard that required use of the patent holder's patent....
[T]he patent holder refused to license, or would license
only at exorbitant rates.49
Although one may be able to juggle an analysis of these types of
cases into the three exceptions described in Xerox,5 ° it appears
unlikely the Federal Circuit would be willing to do so.
Before its decisions in Xerox and Intergraph, the Federal Circuit
had left open the possibility of predatory design change, which pre-
sumably would not fall into the three Xerox exceptions. C.R. Bard,
Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.5 1 involved various patent and antitrust issues
relating to tissue sampling devices. A jury verdict found in favor of
M3 (1) that Bard's patents were invalid, (2) M3 had not violated the
patents, (3) Bard was guilty of fraud on the PTO, (4) Bard violated
the antitrust laws, and (5) it engaged in patent misuse.52 The Federal
Circuit, in a divided panel, dismissed all charges except patent inva-
lidity for violating the on-sale bar and the antitrust count.53 It may be
helpful to consider the facts in this case more closely.
Biopsies can be performed with a variety of tissue sampling de-
vices. The devices at issue included a "gun" and disposable needles
used with the gun to take certain types of tissue samples. Bard had
claimed patent infringement by M3 on Bard's guns and needles. M3
alleged that Bard had deliberately changed the design of its biopsy
gun to make it incompatible with M3's competing needles. Accord-
ing to the dissent in the Federal Circuit's opinion, the redesign was
within the claims of Bard's patents.
The majority of the panel found that there was enough evidence
for the jury to find "Bard maintained its monopoly position by exclu-
sionary conduct, to wit, modifying its patented gun in order to ex-
49 lId at 922-23.
5o See Schwartz, supra note 28 for a discussion of these examples.
5' 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12 See id. at 1346.
5 See iL An "on-sale" bar is when a company is found to have made commercial sales
of a product containing claims in a patent application more than a year before the inventor ap-
plies for a patent. If the product is found to have been sold under these circumstances, the pat-
ent is not valid.
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clude competing replacement needles." 54  The dissent stated that
modifications improved Bard's guns, and that preventing such modi-
fications would have the "pernicious" effect of penalizing innovators
for improving their products. 55 However, the majority found "there
was substantial evidence that Bard's real reasons for modifying the
gun were to raise the cost of entry to potential makers of replacement
needles, to make doctors apprehensive about using non-Bard needles,
and to preclude the use of 'copycat' needles. 56
The Federal Circuit declined Bard's petition for rehearing in
banc.57 However, two of the judges in the concurrence stated that:
Bard did not argue to this court that modification of a pat-
ented product within the scope of the claims by a patentee
cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an antitrust violation.
Nor did Bard challenge the jury instructions .... The major-
ity opinion turns solely on Bard's argument regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence and its failure to challenge the
propriety of the jury instructions. The question of whether or
not a cause of action premised upon the antitrust laws exists
when a patentee redesigns a patented product within the
scope of the patent claims, awaits another day.58
The Federal Circuit's Xerox decision suggests that the type of preda-
tory design theory allowed in the Bard case may now be disallowed if
pleaded differently, regardless of the evidence on intent or efficiency
justifications for the design change.
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the interplay between in-
tellectual property rights and competition suggests little or no trade
off between these two policy interests, except in perhaps the three
areas identified in its Xerox decision. In particular, the trend in the
Federal Circuit's decisions suggests it is likely to base its analysis by
determining whether there is any patent issue involved, rather than
allowing juries and lower courts to examine evidence of the net effect
of a patent holder's actions on innovation and competition.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AGREEMENTS TO SETTLE
PATENT DIsPuTES
The Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Prop-
erty. focus most of their analysis on the conditions where agreements
'4 Id. at 1368 (noting that "the evidence of Bard's market power was in dispute").
5 Id. at 1382.
56 Id.
-7 C.R. Bard v. M3 Sys., Inc., 161 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir 1998).
18 Id., 1380-81 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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among intellectual property holders might defeat competition, and in
general present a balanced analysis of intellectual property rights and
competitive concerns in this area. The FrC has recently focused sev-
eral actions against companies that have settled patent disputes in
ways the FTC has believed to be anticompetitive. These include the
recent series of brand and generic drug agreements relating to the
statutory provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the agreement
and consent in FTC v. Summit Technology, Inc. and VISX, Inc.59 Each
of these cases is very fact specific. The FTC is now engaged in a
broad sweep of generic drug agreements to locate other agreements
that the FrC may consider anticompetitive.
60
Some courts have found some of these agreements per se ille-
gal, and the AAI has submitted an amicus brief that urges upholding a
per se rule of anticompetitive market division in one of these cases.6
Similarly former Chairman Pitofsky expressed the view that:
[T]he key provisions effectively paying the generic to stay
off the market (and by staying out to preclude other from en-
tering the market), along with ancillary provisions blocking
competing sales, lead the Commission to conclude that the
primary purpose and effect of the arrangement was to extend
the defacto duration of the patent by private agreement. 62
Others have disagreed with this position. For example, Gilbert
and Tom state "the fact that the settlement involves a payment from
the patentee to the challenger is not sufficient to determine the settle-
ment is anticompetitive." 63 Similarly, in discussing these cases FrC
Commissioner Leary has written:
I think the issues in these patent settlements are difficult and
individual facts are important. These settlements, like any
patent settlement, require a resolution of two conflicting poli-
cies. On the one hand, there is a policy in favor of resolving
disputes in order to conserve public and private resources
59 FTC Dkt. No. 9286 (1999), at http://www.ftc.gov/ 1999/9903/d0928visxd%26o.htm.
60 See Timothy J. Muris, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a
Word-Continuity, Prepared Remarks Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section
Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, at http:llwww.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/mursiaba.htm (Aug. 7,
2001).
61 See In Re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1278, Case No. 00-2483 (6th Cir.
2001). I have had no involvement in this AAI brief, and am not commenting on it.
62 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of
the New Economy, Prepared Remarks at Antitrust, Technology and Intellectual Property Con-
ference, Univ. of California, Berkley, CA, at http:llwww.ftc.gov./speeches/pitofsky/ ipf3Ol.htm
(Mar. 2,2001).
6 Gilbert and Tom, supra note 15, at 78.
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and, in some cases, to facilitate entry. On the other hand,
there is always a risk of a collusive agreement to share mo-
nopoly profits from an individual patent. In the pharmaceuti-
cal area, these issues are played off against a special regula-
tory framework. 64
As with my concern that intellectual property protection should
not completely trump antitrust concerns, I believe antitrust analysis of
patent settlements should be based on a careful analysis of the facts
and economics of each case-however these cases are argued legally.
IV. THE PROCESS OF GRANTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION AND THE PRESUMPTION THAT GRANTING PATENTS
ALWAYS PROTECTS INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE
In enforcing many of the intellectual property laws, there is a
presumption that the Patent and Trademark Office effectively protects
the legitimate intellectual property interests of inventors of unique
products, processes, written works, and trademarks. There are at least
three challenges to the PTO in fulfilling this job.
First, the patent process is ex parte. In this type of process there
may be a greater likelihood of making decisions that undercut compe-
tition, because the initial information comes from the company seek-
ing a legally recognized monopoly.
Second, the PTO does the best job ensuring the legitimacy of
patent applications that it can, given the resources that it possesses.
However, there has been a rapid increase in patent filings. As illus-
trated in Figure 2, in 2000, the PTO received over 293,000 applica-
tions, or over a thousand patent applications per work day. From
1996 to 2000, the PTO had a 53 percent increase in patent applica-
tions, and almost an 8 percent increase in applications from just 1999
to 2000. It unclear whether the PTO can effectively process this mas-
sive and increasing number of patents, as reflected in the PTO's own
projections of an increasing inventory of unprocessed patent applica-
tions.65
Third, much of the recent increases in filings have been for
"business methods" such as "one click" ordering, rather than the
traditional product and process patents. Some have suggested that the
PTO has been granting many questionable patents without adequate
review. Figure 2 also illustrates that although currently a relatively
64 Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes,
Prepared Remarks Before the Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern School
of Law, Chicago, IL, at http:llwww.ftc.gov/speecheslleary/learypharma.htm (Nov. 3, 2000).
65 See PTO ANN. REP. (1996-2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov.
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small portion of total patent applications, the number of business
methods applications increased 276 percent from just 1999 to 2000.66
As a result of these three factors, and the Federal Circuit's decisions
that apparently imply a strong presumption of the legitimacy and su-
premacy of any patent issued, the patent process could be offering a
greater degree of protection against competition than is intended.
Figure 2: Patent Applications 1996-2000
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U.S. P.T.O. ANN. REP. (2000), available at http://www.pto.gov; Fewer Patents on Methods Get
Clearance. WALL ST. J.. Mar. 21. 2001. at A3.
See William Bulkely, Fewer Patents on Methods get Clearance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2001, at A3.
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Three policy issues arise in this context. First, the PTO ap-
proves about three-quarters of the patent applications it considers.
Is the PTO approving this high a percentage of patents actually dis-
couraging innovation, as some companies seek to obtain wide ranging
patents on questionably unique claims? Given that there needs to be a
balance between protecting the intellectual property rights of early
inventors and subsequent inventors, as Landes and Posner show,
granting too sweeping rights to early inventors through the issuance
of questionable or overbroad patents can deter innovation from sub-
sequent inventors. This can have the perverse effect of reducing the
incentives to innovate optimally, which the intellectual property laws
are presumably designed to protect. Despite the fact that patent hold-
ers are responsible for protecting their patent rights, my reading of the
recent Federal Circuit decisions suggests that an inadequate review of
patent applications could discourage or eliminate much innovation.
Accordingly, the PTO may need more resources to process
claims both quickly and accurately. To the extent that the PTO will
continue to issue business practice patents, the PTO may also want to
consider increasing the number of patent examiners with more busi-
ness training and experience. It may even be desirable for the PTO
and the antitrust agencies to regularly share information, to see if the
patent processing system and antitrust enforcement are having their
desired effects. Under any condition, I believe it would be beneficial
If the FTC, General Accounting Office ("GAO"), or another agency
to study the patent processing system to determine the impact of eas-
ing or tightening the current patent processing system.
Second, how does one define intellectual property that should
be protected by law? Innovative techniques in production have often
been guarded as trade secrets, but many of the new business innova-
tions in the information age can be copied quickly by competitors-as
numerous e-businesses have found out. However, should a firm be
able to patent any business practice? Presumably one cannot patent a
business practice that people practiced in the field would see as obvi-
ous, but can the PTO apply this test effectively given the increase in
these types of patents? The result of granting an excessively large
number of business practices patents can create a number of wide
ranging "monopolists," and substantially postpone the benefits of
shorter term competition as well as deter subsequent innovations.
The PTO has recently rethought its granting of so many business
methods patents, and has stated it will give them more scrutiny.68 I
applaud this policy change.
67 See id. ("Overall, the Patent Office last year granted 182,223, or 72%, of the 252,871
patent applications it studied.").
61 See id.
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Third, would it be desirable for the patent office to take some
aspects of competition into account? If so, should the FTC study the
patent-granting process to evaluate ways in which anticompetitive
issues might be spotted in advance? Should there be any legislation
or other actions that better institutionalize potential competitive con-
cerns? Should the patent office hire attorneys and economists that
perform at some level competitive analyses, similar to the Department
of Defense's procurement group? I do not endorse any of these al-
ternatives, but I would be interested in reactions to these or other al-
ternatives.
V. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
I believe there should be an explicit recognition and accounting
of the unique aspects of intellectual property. In this light, there need
to be more research on optimal intellectual property rights protection,
the trend in court decisions, and the limitations of the PTO. Depend-
ing on the results of this research, policies should be changed where
appropriate.
In particular, the intellectual property/antitrust tradeoff calls for
several actions to be considered. First, there should be more eco-
nomic and policy analysis of the full impact of intellectual property
on competition and innovation. Not only is there a need for better
and more detailed theoretical analysis of the unique aspects of intel-
lectual property in a world of rapid technological change and network
effects, but more empirical research is needed to provide a solid basis
for both antitrust analysis and intellectual property protection. Pro-
fessor Scherer and others have engaged in empirical research on
competition and innovation, but more needs to be done.
Quantifying the impact of broad intellectual property rights and
competition on innovation is difficult, since it is difficult to measure
true innovations. However, research is possible on the impact of in-
tellectual property rights on at least research and development, and
case studies could provide useful insights. For example, is there evi-
dence that antitrust cases are being reformulated as patent cases to get
them into the Federal Circuit and limit antitrust exposure?. If yes, has
this damaged either short run price competition or incentive for sec-
ond generation inventors to innovate? Are there any instances where
firms asserting patent protection for some of their products should be
required to sell any of their products at nondiscriminatory terms?
The PTO and the antitrust agencies jointly may benefit from
creating a task force to provide a broader empirical and theoretical
basis for competition and intellectual property policy. It is my under-
standing that the American Antitrust Institute would be willing to fa-
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cilitate any such efforts, including co-hosting a forum, proposing a
specific research agenda, or undertaking its own study.
Second, there needs to be a critical look at the way the courts
and agencies balance the protection of individual and joint intellectual
property vs. their effect on competition. In particular, there should be
a review of the Federal Circuit's apparent strengthening of patent
rights over competitive concerns in light of its conflict with the anti-
trust agencies' and Ninth Circuit's approaches. The tension between
the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision and the Federal Circuit's Xerox
decision will need to be resolved in a case that presents a clear test of
when antitrust issues can be considered in the presence of patents.
Absent such a resolve or a consensus, both primary and developmen-
tal innovations are likely to be deterred by the existing uncertainty in
the courts.
Third, there needs to be a review of the PTO's procedures. The
existing decisions by the Federal Circuit give great weight to issued
patents, and the PTO. The relatively new policy of granting many
business practice patents, in particular, could threaten legitimate
competition across many markets for many years by establishing mo-
nopolies over efficient business practices that may not truly be pat-
entable innovations.
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